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Demarcating the Domain of Rhetoric 
The discoveries of science and technology are accelerating. The choice of 
how to regulate and react to scientific and technological innovations relies 
heavily on the notion of risk.  The emergence nature contemporary 
science and technology (i.e., complex systems that are not reducible to the 
simple physical and chemical processes from which they arose) confounds 
risk studies (Goodenough & Deacon, 2006).  Indeed, whether to embark 
on a particular path of scientific inquiry or proceed with a technological 
development depends on the ability to calculate the amount of risk 
associated with the endeavor.  We are, however, ill-equipped to resolve 
the demands of risk analysis with certainty. 
The greater the negative risk, the greater our reticence to proceed. The 
very term “calculate,” however, invests risk with a far greater degree of 
objectivity and precision than actually present in the conduct of science or 
policymaking. Sandman’s (1993) famous definition of risk as “the sum of 
hazard plus outrage” positions emotion (albeit only one species of it) 
placed squarely alongside the calculus of threat probability--much as 
Aristotle, who brought emotion into the charmed circle of internally artful 
means of persuasion, declared rhetoric the counterpart (antistrophe) of 
dialectic. Research on the significance of affective forces in determining 
how people perceive risk (Slovic, 2000, 2010) creates ample 
opportunities for rhetorical studies to complement social scientific 
research on cognition of risk. 
What Can Rhetorical Approaches to Risk Offer? 
The field of communication is no stranger to the realm of risk, but most 
attention has focused on risk management, often approached as crisis 
communication (e.g., Venette, 2006). This area of study concentrates on 
how to package and present phenomena to audiences in ways that 
accomplish the rhetor’s intent, which is usually to steer audience 
perceptions in a particular direction or to protect the interests of 
stakeholders. Risk management thus operates within a compliance-
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gaining paradigm by focusing on how sources craft messages (Sellnow, 
Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009), prioritizing how risk is presented 
rather than how risk is constructed by various stakeholders.   
One important contribution that rhetorical analysis can make is to 
disaggregate the notion of “the public” as a unitary audience, usually 
contrasted with no less unitary “experts,” and to examine instead 
rhetorical influences in how various publics recognize and react to risks 
(Berube, 2007). For example, more research needs to be conducted on 
how particular publics—bounded groups defined by demographic 
variables—interface with the realms of justification they invoke when 
making or assessing arguments. How do the modes of justification (what 
counts as proof, what qualifies as convincing) correlate with 
demographically delineated publics? Do certain classifications of people 
(socioeconomic status, educational level, etc.) characteristically resort to 
certain types of rhetorical devices, interpretive methods, evaluative 
criteria, or argumentative tactics? What implications might such findings 
have for bridging the communicative chasms that separate various 
stakeholders in scientific and technological ventures? 
Rhetorical issues leap to the foreground most blatantly in science and 
technology when technical issues enter a public forum beyond the scope 
of scientific discourse. Since consideration of risk affects all stakeholders 
involved in an issue, discussions of risk automatically extend 
communication beyond the discursive domains dominated by scientific 
researchers, engineers, and other technicians. Research in the public 
understanding of science addresses the confluences and confusions 
between these discursive domains, guided in part by discrimination of 
discursive spheres and detailed consideration of how they bump up 
against each other (Goodnight, 1982). Rhetorical analysis can contribute 
to knowledge about several factors that problematize the communication 
of risk. 
A long history of research indicates that scientific experts define and 
evaluate levels of risk differently from non-experts (e.g., Fischhoff, 
Watson, & Hope, 1984). These disjunctions can cause communication 
breakdowns between different stakeholders (e.g., researchers, product 
developers, policymakers, consumers) who operate under different 
conceptions of risk (Slovic, 1987). A more “rhetoricized” approach to risk 
might take up some of the following issues. 
 
The Inaccessibility of Science  
The technical nature of much scientific discourse may render it 
incomprehensible to audiences of non-scientists. Scientific discourse may 
remain inaccessible to non-specialists in at least three ways. First, 
prevalence of scientific jargon may restrict public access to the 
terminology needed for engagement in meaningful discussion with 
researchers. Second, much research deals with unobservable phenomena. 
Lacking proper technological tools to observe relevant images (for 
example, the visual configurations of nanoparticles visible only through 
enhanced images from electron microscopy), non-specialists may have to 
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defer to the renditions produced by researchers, illustrators, and 
computer graphics artists (Landau et al., 2009; Lösch, 2006; Ruivenkamp 
& Rip, 2010). Those who control the imagery may unduly influence how 
phenomena are perceived. Third, many phenomena operate 
counterintuitively, as when nanoparticles behave quite differently in their 
quantum-mechanically governed worlds than macroparticles of the 
identical substance. If basic laws of the macro-world (e.g., toxicity levels, 
conductivity, and gravitational attraction) no longer operate in customary 
ways, and they do not in the nano-world, then fundamental assumptions 
such as the properties of chemical substances qualify as contestable. 
Furthermore, counterintuitive facts and processes challenge the notion 
that common sense can guide argumentation, since basic notions such as 
cause and effect become questionable or conditional. Such 
counterintuitive points further distance scientific discourse from non-
scientific discursive realms. The issue is framed in its most naked form in 
the evidence for evolution.  
Since this impenetrability may fuel confusion or suspicion that 
researchers are trying to hide risks, translating technical vocabulary into 
more accessible terms can improve trust between different groups of 
stakeholders (Kasperson & Stallen, 1991). Rhetorical scholarship can 
address the complexities and nuances of these translations. What is lost, 
gained, or altered in the process of translating concepts from one 
audience to another?  Notably, rhetoricians can approach translation as 
multi-directional—not a “dumbing down” of scientific discourse, but a 
search for common argumentative, affective, and conceptual ground that 
will improve how various stakeholder communities understand each 
other. 
 
The Fact of Uncertainty and the Difficulty of Gaining Trust    
A stakeholder public often has difficulties establishing trust in relation to 
science-based argumentation (Hipkins et al., 2002).  While rhetoric can 
enable public understanding (Gross, 1994), the resulting understanding is 
always mediated by social context (Wynne, 1992, 1993; Lach & Sanford, 
2010). It is also influenced by uncertainty, which is often the product, or 
even construction, of the media (Mellor, 2010; Zehr, 2000). Additionally, 
at the individual level, the media, as articulated by Kurt Neuwirth (2009), 
“are thought to influence intrapersonal (one’s own salience judgments) 
agendas, perceived community (what others in the community consider 
important) agendas, and interpersonal (actual discussion of issues) 
agendas” (p. 400). As a result, a “simple” act of demonstration-based 
proof (apodeixis)—proving climate change is occurring, proving humans 
create pollution, proving a definite degree of risk exists (or does not)—
becomes an enormous and convoluted task that is immensely contingent 
upon a rhetor’s awareness of audience, situation, and sociopolitical 
context (deixis and pisteis), plus his or her skill in negotiating the shoals. 
In addition, consensus among scientists is rare. Expert disagreement may 
signify to non-experts that risks remain unknown. If this disagreement is 
attributed to scientific research per se, then risk levels may be judged as 
unknowable. 
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Finally, the determination to resolve uncertainty with more certainty 
may destine risk assessment and management to the dumpsters. 
Scientific research seldom increases certainty. Risk analysis demands 
decision making in situations of high uncertainty while the models we use 
are certainty-based (e.g., calculable probabilities, measurable exposure 
levels). Given the rate of change in science and technology, it is same to 
presume certainty will remain elusive and risk calculi premised on 
discrete values may need to be replaced. Given the deterministic ends 
associated with risk analysis this is one of the biggest challenges for risk 
science. How we package data and recommendations will be profoundly 
affected by the rhetorics of uncertainty. 
 
Speculation and Sensationalism  
Technical obfuscation represents only one potential source of 
miscommunication. Sweeping, dramatic, often minimally warranted 
claims may dismiss or exaggerate risks and divert attention from more 
nuanced risk assessment. For example, caricatures of nanotechnology as 
the solution to problems from the energy crisis to cancer treatments—
often promulgated by investors and media outlets seeking remarkable, 
immediate results—may steal the discursive stage from the qualified, 
tentative, long-range claims made by researchers (Berube, 2006). What 
rhetorical resources might generate the interest of stakeholders while 
maintaining fidelity to the cautious, often long-range claims emerging 
from scientific research? 
 
Insufficient Data in a Crisis  
Emerging technologies may not be well known enough for the long-term 
effects of their actions/use to be quantitatively studied. By the time a 
study is completed, damage done by employed technologies may already 
be irreparable. Relatedly, “relevant information about environmental and 
health hazards often develops more rapidly than [agencies] are able to 
respond” (Tai, 2005, p. 1). The Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of 
Mexico illustrates this concern. The rapidly-progressing nature of the 
disaster meant that there was no time for quantitative assessment of 
measures. In crisis, decision makers must base their choices on what they 
know, what they can learn, and what their discourse communities can 
provide. They must do all of this while communicating the potential value 
of their decisions to publics that, ultimately, are called upon to trust 
experts and agencies to work in their best interests. Establishing such 
trust, however, is problematic. 
 
Skepticism About Experts  
When non-specialists do not have access to the specialized methods and 
technical vocabulary of scientists, they often are asked to trust the 
researchers and technicians who presumably would act as stewards for 
various stakeholder interests (Jenkins-Smith & Silva, 1998). This trust 
operates along several dimensions. Social trust encompasses the 
 
Schwartzmann, Ross, and Berube 5 Poroi, 7,1 (January 2011) 
traditional realm of perceived source credibility adapted from Aristotle: 
expertise, character, and caring. Social trust applies to particular people 
or organizations. Lay publics, however, often view technical experts 
skeptically (Sjöberg, 2002), sometimes suspecting that these specialists 
are biased toward or in cahoots with special interests and product 
developers. Epistemic trust applies to science as an institution, and 
systemic distrust of science may lead to construing risks of scientific 
research and technological applications as disproportionately high 
(Sjöberg & Herber, 2008). Simply adding layers of expert testimony does 
not automatically quell fear about risks. Rhetorically speaking, over-
reliance on experts may amplify suspicions about credibility, particularly 
among audiences who harbor low epistemic trust toward scientists or 
engineers. A more productive approach to risk communication would be 
to involve a broader range of testimonies and sources of information, thus 
avoiding pitting one contingent of stakeholders against another. 
Further research should address how the ethos of science is 
constructed, presented, and challenged in ways that amplify or attenuate 
perceptions of risk. How and for which publics does science seem to 
embrace antagonistic goals and values? Under what conditions and for 
whom does science don the mantle of authority? 
 
The Narrative Arcs of Risk Communication  
The rhetorical trajectory of risk operates along synchronic and diachronic 
axes. Synchronically, the construction or perception of something as a risk 
emerges relative to concurrent risks. The degree of risk should be 
measured not simply as the product of 
(statistical probability of occurrence) × (quantifiable magnitude of 
effect) 
but at least partially in relationship to the various narratives of risks 
(Alcabes, 2009) that circulate via avenues such as mass media (Neuwirth, 
2009). Even when probability and magnitude of risk are objectively 
measurable, this information—if known—does not sufficiently explain 
human behaviors that may correspond poorly to such calculations 
(Luhmann, 1993). Rhetorical investigation reveals the rationales 
underlying the social construction of risk (Luhmann, 1993), clarifying the 
means of persuasion whereby degrees of risk are understood.  
Especially when the measurable degree of risk is unknown or poorly 
understood, as in the case of emergent technological innovations, risk 
assessment becomes a relative judgment reliant on heuristics that 
establish the comparative threat levels. Such judgments invoke factors 
such as personal values including religiosity (Ho, Scheufele, & Corley, in 
press), comportment of innovations with pre-existing beliefs (Gardner, 
2008), past experiences, activation of emotions (Slovic et al., 2004, 
2007), and perceived proximity to the risk-inducing phenomena. The 
understanding of risk arises as an intuitive construct holistically formed 
(Marshall et al., 2007) from the entire spectrum of variables that (a) 
establish what counts as risk; (b) assess the relative degree of risk; (c) 
determine what counts as an acceptable level of risk. Rhetorical analysis 
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can shed important light on how the heuristic mechanisms for 
determining risk reinvigorate the study of argumentative fallacies—not 
simply as faulty arguments but as sense-making mechanisms employed 
when resources (e.g., access to data, criteria for evaluating source 
credibility, etc.) for more traditionally scientific modes of “valid” 
inductive and deductive argumentation are rejected, unavailable, or 
unsatisfactory. 
Diachronically, rhetorical analysis could trace the course of how risks 
are constructed. One area ripe for further rhetorical harvest concerns the 
ways that risk scenarios discredited by scientific researchers persist and 
evolve into concerns that occupy other stakeholders.  For example, why 
do horror stories of killer nanobots still play a role in popular portrayals 
of nanotechnology long after being scientifically debunked and even 
disavowed by the author of the original scenario (Schwartzman & 
Carlone, 2008)? Another avenue of diachronic research might examine 
the cultural transmission of narratives about science as an institution, 
illuminating how the persona of the scientist evolves over time in ways 
that foster deference or dread toward scientific knowledge and thus affect 
epistemic trust (e.g., the scientist as savior vs. the mad scientist). 
 
Audience Differences  
A public’s difficulty in making decisions based on their understanding of 
scientific or technological information does not necessarily result from 
insufficient understanding or misconceptions of science itself. Risk-
related information is often scientific in nature, and such discourse is 
both culturally and politically mediated (Graham & Lindeman, 2005). 
Research suggests that individuals create “landscapes” based on 
“intersubjective, taken-for-granted symbols” which are complex 
constructions based on their social groups and self-perceptions (Greider & 
Garkovich, 1994, p. 9). This socially constructed perception of risk-related 
activities is not based in ignorance (see work on the deficit model of 
public understanding of science, such as Bauer, Allum, & Miller, 2007; 
Sturgis & Allum, 2004; Maranta et al., 2003; Gross, 1994). Instead, this 
amalgam of intuitive approaches to risk assessment plays an important 
role in a public’s understanding of complex information (Allum et al., 
2008; Sturgis & Allum, 2004; Gross, 1994). 
Rather than dismiss these heuristics as cognitive distortions to be 
purged with a healthy emetic of scientific literacy, a rhetorical approach 
takes seriously the ways these decision-making tools are activated 
through communication and how they are deployed when people 
interface with scientifically justified knowledge claims. The issue may be 
less that of bringing laypeople up to speed with science and improving the 
accuracy of their perceptions (Wrench, 2007) than of developing deeper 
appreciation for the ways non-scientists formulate perceptions of science 
and technology beyond the constraints of logical argumentation and 
scientific method. For example, rhetorical analysis can probe heuristic 
alternatives to logical implicature, investigating modes of narrative or 
mythological implicature that constitute compelling plot lines, but do not 
qualify as authorized discourse by scientific standards.  
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